Democratic Reforms in Dictatorships: Elite Divisions, Party Origins, and the Prospects of Political Liberalization
Descripción general
Resumen del artículo
This paper examines how elite divisions within authoritarian regimes impact political liberalization, finding that the origins of the ruling party play a crucial moderating role. Elite divisions are more likely to lead to liberalization when the ruling party did *not* originate from national struggles (revolutions, etc.), like in Portugal's Carnation Revolution. However, when parties arise from such struggles, as with China's CCP, they can effectively use carrots and sticks to prevent elite divisions from sparking reform.
Explícamelo como si tuviera cinco años
Internal fighting among elites in dictatorships sometimes leads to more freedom, but this depends on how the ruling party came to power. If the party fought a revolution or similar struggle to gain control, they're less likely to give up power even with internal disagreements.
Posibles conflictos de intereses
None identified
Limitaciones identificadas
Explicación de la calificación
This is a strong comparative political science study that addresses a critical gap in democratization research by examining when elite divisions lead to reform. The use of a panel matching estimator and comprehensive robustness checks strengthens the analysis, although limitations regarding generalizability to all authoritarian regimes and the need for more fine-grained data on elite dissent are acknowledged.
Conviene saber
Este es el análisis de Starter. Paperzilla Pro verifica cada cita, investiga los antecedentes de los autores y las fuentes de financiación, y utiliza razonamiento avanzado con IA para ofrecer información más exhaustiva.
Explorar Pro →